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PETTY CRIMINAL DISFRANCHISEMENT
WHEN I WORKED in my first criminal dis-franchisement case in 1979, I thought it
was a mere tidying up operation, an effort to
overturn the last vestiges of the openly racist
1901 “disfranchisement convention” in darkest
Alabama.1 I never imagined that the issue
would become much more critical in the ensu-
ing decades and that in 2006, I would be em-
ployed as an expert witness against felon dis-
franchisement in what claims to be the
enlightened state of Washington.2 In many re-
spects, the world has not moved forward.
In 1974, I had published The Shaping of South-
ern Politics,3 which analyzed the transformation
of southern politics by electoral laws passed
from the 1870s through 1908 in the eleven states
that had managed to secede from the Union
during the Civil War. One of the simplest and
most blatantly racist of these types of laws per-
manently disfranchised men for such crimes 
as “miscegenation,” “wife beating,” and petty
theft, and included some misdemeanors, while
excluding some serious felonies, such as assault
and battery and second degree manslaughter.4
Ironically, Section 182 of the Alabama consti-
tution of 1901 nominally disfranchised election
officials if they made “false returns,” despite
the fact that ballot box stuffing was notoriously
applied—indeed, was absolutely necessary—in
the referenda that called the convention and
ratified the constitution.5
When Ed Still, a Birmingham attorney coop-
erating with the ACLU, who had an unusually
J. Morgan Kousser is Professor of History and Social Sci-
ence at Caltech.
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nied sub nom Farrakhan v. Locke, 543 U.S. 984 (2004). His
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PARTY SOUTH (1974), hereinafter SHAPING.
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inafter Underwood.
5 SHAPING, supra note 3, at 166.
keen sense of the importance of historical is-
sues in legal cases, cold-called me to ask
whether I believed that Alabama’s criminal dis-
franchisement provision had been adopted in
1901 with a racially discriminatory purpose
and whether I would be willing to testify in
court to that effect, I jumped at the chance to
put my historical skills to work to rectify some
of the racist practices I had studied for so long.
I wrote a short report summarizing the evi-
dence. All historians agreed that the central
purpose of the constitutional convention was
to disfranchise blacks. More specifically, the
framer of the crimes section of the suffrage ar-
ticle, John Fielding Burns, claimed that the
wife-beating provision alone could disfran-
chise 60 percent of the black adult males in the
state, a fact about the workings of the criminal
justice system that he, as a magistrate in the
rural area around Selma, was in a position to
speak about with some authority.6 Although
Federal District Court Judge Frank McFadden,
who first heard the Underwood case, did not
publish an opinion on the subject, he indicated
that he agreed with the State that the 1901 con-
vention’s desire to disfranchise poor whites ex-
cused its intention to disfranchise blacks. Ex-
amining the evidence much more closely, and
rejecting the class rationale as legally incorrect
and a proposed good government rationale as
unsupported by the evidence, Circuit Court
Judge Robert Vance ruled disfranchisement for
misdemeanors in Alabama unconstitutional,
and the Supreme Court unanimously af-
firmed.7
In response, the Alabama legislature pro-
posed and the people of the state in 1996 passed
a whitewashed constitutional amendment that
substituted a vague “moral turpitude” disfran-
chisement provision for the more specific and
more obviously discriminatory list in the 1901
constitution.8 Over the years, the huge expan-
sion of the prison population, largely African-
American, magnified the effect of the disfran-
chisement provision far beyond that of 1979. Ed
Still continues to litigate felon disfranchisement
in Alabama.9
One of the chief revisionist themes of Shap-
ing was that suffrage restriction had partisan,
as well as racial and class purposes. Democrats
were sometimes open about their partisan
aims, and southern white Republicans and
Populists often overcame their discomfort
about black suffrage because they knew that
African-Americans generally supported parties
that opposed the Democratic Establishment.
Philosophical reasons for and against suffrage
laws, I concluded more generally, almost al-
ways hid more self-interested impulses.10 In
both of these respects, the importance of parti-
sanship and the comparative unimportance of
ideology in struggles over criminal disfran-




If Al Gore had been credited with 600 more
votes in Florida in 2000, the eventful history of
the world since then would have been re-
markably different. By the presidential race of
2004, 5.3 million Americans,11 over a fifth of
whom lived in Florida,12 were disfranchised
because they had been convicted of felonies or,
in six states, misdemeanors.13 According to Jeff
Manza and Christopher Uggen, a dispropor-
tionate number of the disfranchised would
have voted for Gore.14 If one percent of the dis-
franchised felons in Florida had voted, and
they had split sixty-forty for the Democrat,
George W. Bush would not have been elected
president.
In their comprehensive and fascinating new
book, which both sums up and markedly ex-
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8 “No person convicted of a felony involving moral turpi-
tude, or who is mentally incompetent, shall be qualified
to vote until restoration of civil and political rights or re-
moval of disability.” Alabama Const., Art. VIII, Section
196A(b) (2005).
9 Val Walton, Federal judges urge settlement in voting law-
suit, Birmingham News, March 8, 2006.
10 J. Morgan Kousser, Suffrage, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 1236, 1240–44 (Jack P.
Greene, ed., 1984).
11 Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Lcocked Out: Felon
Disenfranchisement and American Democracy 250 (2006),
hereinafter LOCKED OUT.
12 Id. at 248.
13 Id. at 9.
14 Id. at 191–93.
tends the burgeoning literature on the topic, so-
ciologists Manza and Uggen emphasize that
alone among democracies, America disfran-
chises felons after their release from prison,
probation, and parole.15 Such ex-felons (over-
whelmingly males) constitute thirty-nine per-
cent of those disfranchised for crimes in the
U.S. Only twenty-seven percent of felons who
are denied the vote are currently incarcerated.
The other thirty-four percent are on probation
or parole.16 Sixteen million Americans now
have felony convictions on their records, and
many do not realize that permanent disfran-
chisement laws were weakened in the 1960s,
70s, and 90s. Not only are they often unaware
that they can now register and vote, but they
are frequently misinformed about those rights
by state employees.17
Although their principal focus is on the pres-
ent, Manza and Uggen have interesting things
to say about the past. Criminal disfranchise-
ment provisions in nineteen U.S. states pre-
ceded widespread black enfranchisement in
the late 1860s, but nearly all of these laws suc-
ceeded or came at the same time as the aboli-
tion of property qualifications for white male
voting. This entirely circumstantial evidence
suggests to Manza and Uggen a desire by an-
tebellum state constitution-makers to temper
political equality by excluding the most “un-
desirable” white voters.18 More work is needed
on this claim.
But felon disfranchisement is now and has
always been primarily a racial issue in the U.S.
In an “event history” analysis, Manza and
Uggen show that the order in which criminal
disfranchisement laws were passed or ex-
tended from 1840 on was statistically associ-
ated with indices of black political threat.19
Despite the currently “colorblind” laws, dis-
franchisement for crime continues to be a racial
issue today. Because of biases in the criminal
justice system, disfranchisement for crime now
affects African-American men more than Lati-
nos and much more than Anglos. One in seven
black men is disfranchised for crime, and in ten
states in America’s decentralized system of suf-
frage, more than fifteen percent of blacks have
lost the vote.20 No state disfranchises as many
as ten percent of whites.21 If current trends con-
tinue, thirty-two percent of black men, seven-
teen percent of Latinos, and fewer than six per-
cent of white men will go to prison during their
lifetimes, suggesting that roughly five times as
high a percentage of African-Americans as of
white men may lose their votes for extended
periods or forever.22
Although the disfranchisement of criminals
has a long history in abstract theorizing from
Aristotle to Locke to Mill, its practical effect has
been fairly minimal until recently. Directly con-
trary to trends in crime rates, which have de-
clined,23 the number of people incarcerated in
the U.S. has grown from 1.2 million to 5.3 mil-
lion in the thirty years since 1976.24 Conviction
rates, sentence lengths, and recidivism because
of technical violations of probation have soared,
inflating disfranchisement rates along with
them. In 2002, thirty-one percent of those con-
victed of felonies in state courts were charged
with drug trafficking or possession, while only
nineteen percent were convicted of violent
crimes. Murderers and rapists, who are often
spotlighted in arguments defending felon dis-
franchisement, made up only four percent of
felons.25 Like the imposition of post-incarcera-
tion disfranchisement, America’s degree of
criminalization is unmatched in other countries.
In incarceration rates, the U.S. is number one,
imprisoning more than three times as high a
proportion of its people as England, seven times
as high as Italy and France, and roughly ten
times as high as Sweden and Switzerland.26
Manza and Uggen term this “the most intensive
incarceration campaign in world history.”27
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16 Id. at 77.
17 Id. at 179, 222–25; Shasha Abramsky, CONNED: HOWE
MILLIONS WENT TO PRISON, LOST THE VOTEK, AND HELPED
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hereinafter CONNED.
18 LOCKED OUT, supra note 11, at 53–55.
19 Id. at 64–67.
20 Id. at 79.
21 Implied by id. Table A 3.3, 248–50.
22 Id. at 71.
23 Id. at 98–99, 110.
24 Id. at 77.
25 Id. at 70.
26 Id., at 70.
27 Id. at 106.
Despite the protestations of the preservers of
felon disfranchisement, such as those offered
by Republican Senators George Allen of Vir-
ginia and Mitch McConnell of Kentucky dur-
ing a 2002 floor debate on a bill to guarantee
the suffrage to released felons in federal elec-
tions,28 the current process of regaining the
vote is Kafkaesque in its complexity and in-
consistency, designed to accomplish by indi-
rection what its proponents usually fear to de-
fend in principle. In Florida, fifteen percent of
the outlawed are eligible to go through an ag-
onizingly slow bureaucratic process, but a full
eighty-five percent must instead, if they wish
their civil rights restored, appear in person be-
fore the governor and his cabinet at quarterly
sessions at which the governor sometimes
questions them about their entirely legal per-
sonal habits before he decides, for reasons that
he need not reveal, arrived at by processes that
he need not justify, whether to continue their
votelessness.29 Studying a random sample of
1,217 files of Floridians who applied to have
their rights restored, Manza and Uggen found
African-Americans less likely than whites to
apply for restoration and less likely, among
those who did apply, to succeed in regaining
their rights.30
In Washington State, where ninety percent
of released felons have fines and or victim
restitution payments to make before their
right to vote can be restored, there is no cen-
tral authority to collect all such “legal finan-
cial obligations” or to monitor their satisfac-
tion, and no obvious way to navigate the
bureaucratic maze.31 Seattle Superior Court
Judge Michael S. Spearman recently declared
that Washington’s suffrage restoration pro-
cess violated both the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution and a similar clause
of the Washington State Constitution.32 The
state is appealing the decision in the suit,
which was brought by the ACLU.33 Between
1996 and 2004, only fifty-three of 29,785 dis-
franchised ex-felons in Washington managed
to regain the vote. In thirteen states that dis-
franchised felons after completion of their
sentences, less than three percent of the 2004
population of disfranchised ex-felons re-
gained their rights.34
THE FUTURE OF FELON VOTING
What would be the consequences if all felons,
all non-incarcerated felons, or all ex-felons
could vote? Drawing on a series of not alto-
gether satisfactory surveys and sets of inter-
views, Manza and Uggen paint a picture of a
population that is different, but not dramati-
cally different, from other voters with the same
class, race, and gender characteristics. Former
public high school students in St. Paul, Min-
nesota who had served time in prison were less
likely than those who had been arrested, but
not jailed, or never arrested, to identify with a
political party,35 trust government,36 discuss
politics,37 or turn out for elections,38 but the for-
merly incarcerated were even more likely than
others surveyed to support Democrat Bill Clin-
ton for president in 1996 and independent Jesse
Ventura for governor in 1998.39 Voting seems
to produce or perhaps only to signal civically-
conscious behavior: Those who voted in 1996
were less likely than non-voters to be arrested
in the four subsequent years and less likely to
admit committing property or violent crimes.40
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28 Id. at 82. In the sixty-six years from 1938 to 2004, only
3,234 Virginia felons had their rights restored. CONNED,
supra note 17, at 175. There were nearly 300,000 disfran-
chised felons in Virginia in 2004. LOCKED OUT, supra note
11, at Table 3, 248–50.
29 LOCKED OUT, supra note 11, at 87–88, 90–92; CONNED,
supra note 17, at 24–26.
30 LOCKED OUT, supra note 11, at 92–94.
31 Jill E. Simmons, Beggars Can’t Be Voters: Why Washing-
ton’s Felon Re-Enfranchisement Law Violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 78 Wash. L.R. 297 (2003); Plaintiff’s First Set
of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Docu-
ments, Objections and Answers Thereto, in Madison v.
State of Washington, State of Washington, King County Su-
perior Court, No. 04-2033414-4 SEA, at 2.
32 Madison v. State of Washington, State of Washington,
King County Superior Court, NO. 04-2033414-4 SEA, slip
op. (March 27, 2006).
33 Rachel La Corte, State to appeal ruling granting voting
rights to felons who owe fines, Seattle Times, March 29, 2006.
34 Computed from LOCKED OUT, supra note 11, at 254,
Table A3.5. Arizona, which keeps no statewide statistics
on restoration, also provides for post-incarceration dis-
franchisement.
35 Id. at 119.
36 Id. at 120.
37 Id. at 121.
38 Id. at 123.
39 Id. at 123–24.
40 Id. at 132–34.
But these conclusions are based on a short-term
panel survey that sampled from an urban area
in a high-turnout, ninety percent white state
with a strong liberal tradition. While this is ap-
parently the only recent survey sample that
asks questions about politics as well as arrests
and incarceration, Manza and Uggen note that
it may not be representative of offenders in the
country as a whole,41 and that it does not span
enough election cycles to establish causal rela-
tionships between voting and crime defini-
tively.42
To probe more deeply into current prisoners’
views on politics, government, and their own
disfranchisement, Manza and Uggen con-
ducted semi-structured interviews with thirty-
three Minnesota prisoners, parolees, and pro-
bationers. None had been radicalized in prison,
and they seemed unlikely to pose any threat 
to the political system if they could vote.43
Though a majority identified as Democrats,44
many called themselves “conservatives,” refer-
ring not so much to policy as to their aspira-
tions for a respectable lifestyle. Most consid-
ered their disfranchisement alienating and
insulting, but not the central disability that re-
sulted from imprisonment.45 Yet it is unsafe to
generalize even these rather undramatic con-
clusions from this small sample, two-thirds of
whom were white and fifteen percent Native
American,46 to the larger population of Amer-
ican felons.
The economist Thomas Miles and others
have argued that felon disfranchisement makes
no difference because people with their demo-
graphic traits—principally poor black and
Latino men with less education and less fam-
ily and geographic stability than other Ameri-
cans—would not vote if they could.47 Manza
and Uggen test Miles’s poorly supported as-
sertion by performing a painstaking regression
analysis using Current Population Survey data
to predict turnout and vote choice among peo-
ple with the same demographic profiles as cur-
rent prisoners. Nationally, they estimate, felon
turnout would generally have run fifteen to
twenty percent behind the turnout of all voters
in the presidential and congressional elections
from 1972 through 2004—i.e., a quarter to a
third would have turned out in presidential
years and slightly fewer in congressional off-
year contests.48 In close elections, these are cer-
tainly large enough numbers to change out-
comes. And as Manza and Uggen acutely point
out, if restrictions were lifted for those who
were no longer incarcerated or no longer on
probation or parole, then more ex-felons would
be aware of the fact that they could vote, and
their turnout would almost certainly rise.49
Some of those who support the continued dis-
franchisement of felons or ex-felons worry
about criminals flooding into the electorate,
while others dismiss re-enfranchisement as a
chimera that would have no effect. Manza and
Uggen’s careful data analysis goes a long way
toward alleviating the fear and undermining
the dismissal.
Although less likely to vote than average cit-
izens, felons, nationally, were twenty to thirty
percent more likely to support Democratic can-
didates in presidential and senatorial contests,
according to Manza and Uggen’s estimates.50
Had disfranchised felons voted in Florida in the
2000 presidential election at the rate and with
the partisan proclivity that Manza and Uggen
estimate for people with their demographic
traits (twenty-seven percent turnout, sixty-nine
percent Democratic), Gore would have carried
the state by eighty thousand votes.51 On the
other hand, if current rates of felon disfran-
chisement are projected back to 1960 (a hypo-
thetical 2.5 million felons, instead of the actual
1.4 million), Richard Nixon would have en-
joyed a national majority of votes over John F.
Kennedy.52 In the thirteen states that disfran-
chise people past the completion of their sen-
tences, they project that between 1978 and 2004,
six senatorial and four gubernatorial outcomes
would have been reversed, with Democratic
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43 Id. at 144.
44 Id. at 147.
45 Id. at 151, 155.
46 Id. at 138.
47 Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter
Turnout, 33 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 85 (2004).
48 LOCKED OUT, supra note 11, at 172.
49 Id. at 179–80.
50 Id. at 190–91.
51 Id. at 192.
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candidates elected rather than Republicans.53 It
is no wonder that felon disfranchisement has
become a highly partisan issue. Nonetheless,
the lack of direct survey evidence on the parti-
san preferences and participatory desires of
prisoners and former prisoners should raise
some cautionary flags. Manza and Uggen are
forced to employ complicated statistical tech-
niques because more straightforward evidence
is currently unavailable.
There is better survey evidence, however, on
the attitudes of the general American public on
felon disfranchisement, and given the seem-
ingly Manichean contemporary view of crimi-
nals in the U.S. (they are incorrigibly evil; we
are essentially good), the results are surprising.
Although only thirty-one percent of Americans
believe that those currently incarcerated
should be able to vote, a full sixty percent feel
that parolees or probationers should be al-
lowed to cast ballots. Eighty percent favor en-
franchising ex-felons, though that percentage
falls to the sixty percent level when specific
crimes are mentioned, and to only fifty-two
percent for those convicted of sex crimes.54 The
public also supports civil liberties beyond vot-
ing for ex-felons. Nearly three-fourths would
allow someone convicted of a drug crime to
give a public speech in favor of drug legaliza-
tion, a level comparable to American support
for freedom of speech for religious and politi-
cal dissenters.55 Thus, Manza and Uggen’s
characterization of public support for felon dis-
franchisement as a “myth” seems well sup-
ported.56
During the 1960s and 70s, nineteen states at
least partly severed the connections between
crime and disfranchisement, and seventeen
others joined them before and after those pro-
gressive decades.57 Manza and Uggen do not
examine why these efforts succeeded and oth-
ers, no doubt, failed—a major lacuna in their
work. They also pay minimal attention to chal-
lenges to criminal disfranchisement in courts
and treat them principally as propaganda ve-
hicles to keep the issue in the news.58 Instead,
they concentrate in their last chapter on the pol-
icy advocacy campaign launched by Marc
Mauer and The Sentencing Project in 1998,
which has produced or incited a barrage of
scholarship, including their book, and they put
their faith in state legislatures.59 While I cer-
tainly do not doubt the energizing effect of the
Sentencing Project and the quality of the schol-
arship it has fostered or inspired, I would have
given attention also to the ACLU, the NAACP-
LDF, and the Brennan Center, which have
fought lengthy legal battles against criminal
disfranchisement, several beginning before the
emergence of The Sentencing Project, and I
would have examined at least a few of the state
legislative struggles on the issue. Study of the
politics of such reform efforts is not only inter-
esting in itself; its lessons may make possible
further successes.
THE DISFRANCHISED AND 
THE POLITICIANS
Sasha Abramsky’s Conned partly fills in the
political gap in Locked Out. Journalistic rather
than academic, qualitative rather than quanti-
tative, and manifestly angry at injustice rather
than coolly principled, Conned combines a trav-
elogue and excerpts from interviews with
felons and political activists on both sides of
the issue with factual descriptions of states’
processes for restoring suffrage rights and leg-
islative efforts to ease the restrictions. A free-
lance journalist long concerned with the con-
sequences of the exponentially rising American
incarceration rates, Abramsky has produced 
a somewhat self-indulgent60 but often com-
pelling attempt to put a human face on the ab-
stract policy problem that Manza and Uggen
analyze.61
Typical of his book is a fourteen-page chap-
ter on the successful effort to authorize auto-
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60 Abramsky’s reactions to the events of the 2004 cam-
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61 In the front matter of his book, Abramsky pointedly
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matic re-enfranchisement for all ex-felons in
Nevada. Led by Chris Giunchigliani, a Las Ve-
gas Democratic Assemblywoman since 1990
who was also president of the state teachers’
union and who represented a poor district in
which ex-felons comprised perhaps ten percent
of the adults, the multi-year effort enlisted civil
rights and community activist organizations
and attracted support largely from Democ-
rats.62 After earlier efforts failed or resulted in
tepid compromises, a bill finally passed the Re-
publican-majority State Senate only because
the Democratic majority in the Assembly
threatened to delay all Republican legislation
originating in the Senate if the re-enfranchise-
ment legislation did not pass. Abramsky briefly
interviewed Representative Giunchigliani and
followed up by visiting an organization that
helped ex-prisoners, EVOLVE, to see how well
informed ex-prisoners were of their new rights.
At EVOLVE, he spotlighted Shawn Smith, an
ex-con excited about voting for the first time
and urging others to regain and exercise their
rights.63 Although Republican opponents of
the 2003 law refused requests for interviews, a
Reno auto-repair shop owner who had spent
fourteen years and $17,000 to obtain a guber-
natorial pardon did talk, and his case shows
how hard it had been to restore rights before
the 2003 change and how much restoration
meant to some former prisoners.64 Unlike what
a historian or many other journalists might do,
Abramsky provides few details on the legisla-
tive process. Unlike what a social scientist
would do, he does not try to estimate the effect
of the 2003 law systematically. Abramsky’s
well-written human snapshots may appeal to
students and general readers, but they do not
tell the whole story.
The repeated themes of Conned from state to
state and from interesting character to inter-
esting character are the complications of the
restoration process, the misinformation often
given to and generally believed by the ex-felons
about their right to vote, and the depth of the
desire of many to recover full citizenship sta-
tus and to help shape the laws that affect them
and their families. In Iowa before 2001, each
former felon who wished to regain his civil
rights had to submit to a pardon board and the
governor an incredibly detailed form including
a complete post-prison employment history,
the names and current addresses of all attor-
neys and judges who had been connected with
the felon’s case, a description of the circum-
stances of the crime, and an argument for why
the felon should be pardoned. Almost none of
the often functionally illiterate former prison-
ers succeeded in fording this bureaucratic
river.65 After 2001, the application form was
simplified, but fewer than one percent of
Iowa’s disfranchised felons made it through the
pardon process each year. A bill to make re-en-
franchisement automatic after all legal obliga-
tions were met could not even be scheduled for
floor consideration in 2004.66
In Montana, crusading ex-cons Casey and
Eddie Rudd gave speeches throughout the
state informing prisoners of their rights and
passing out surveys to their audiences. Most
ex-felons who filled out their questionnaires
thought, incorrectly, that they were perma-
nently debarred from voting.67 Thus, misinfor-
mation serves as a grandfather clause, render-
ing legal liberalization merely theoretical for
many.68
In Texas, a fourteen-year campaign that
moved the law from permanent disfranchise-
ment to waiting periods for re-enfranchisement
to elimination of the waiting period had little
effect. Without presenting systematic evidence,
Abramsky asserts that the reason was the ab-
sence of any legal requirement that state offi-
cials tell felons or ex-felons about the liberal-
ization.69 This unwillingness to foster the
exercise of voting rights, Abramsky points out
acutely, is in stark contrast to the administra-
tive efficiency with which Texas criminal jus-
tice officials apprise voting registrars of who
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has been convicted of a crime and thus has lost
his rights—an ironic example of asymmetric in-
formation distribution in a country supposedly
dedicated to democracy and individual
rights.70
In Tennessee, the legislature markedly
changed the list of crimes resulting in disfran-
chisement four times in twenty-three years, cre-
ating four cohorts of ex-felons with some in
each cohort disfranchised for crimes that
would not have disfranchised them if they had
committed the same crimes five years earlier or
later—a scheme certain to maximize confusion
on the part of election officials and ex-offend-
ers alike. Yet no bill to liberalize or even ratio-
nalize the system made it to the legislative cal-
endar.71 Felons could regain the vote only by
submitting a pardon application that was so
complicated that it required legal assistance.
When some Nashville lawyers let it be known
that they would assist such applicants without
charging fees, they were inundated with hun-
dreds of pleas for help, a testament to how
strongly people sought to regain the suffrage.72
One of the successful Nashville applicants was
Emmette Barrow, a thirty-one-year-old college
graduate and small business owner who had
thirteen years earlier been caught riding in a
car that contained drugs. “The last election
made me think,” he told Abramsky. “How
many guys like me can’t vote? . . . This present
election [2004], every vote counts. . . . I’m kinda
excited now they’re saying [that his vote is] go-
ing to be restored. I’m thinking, Yeah, I make a
difference.”73 Even more energetic was “Jamaica
S.,” a young white woman in Nashville, who
had gotten her citizenship rights back just in
time to vote in 2004 and who e-mailed Abram-
sky breathlessly: “I am a different person al-
ready. I have a sense of accomplishment, re-
demption, and dignity now. I feel validated
and empowered to overcome other obstacles in
my life.”74
REFORM AND RESEARCH
During the consideration of renewing certain
sections of the Voting Rights Act in 2006, felon
disfranchisement was not seriously debated,
even though two of the major civil rights or-
ganizations, the ACLU and the NAACP-LDF,
had for several years been litigating major suits
based on the contention that criminal disfran-
chisement violated Section 2 of the Act.75 A
2005 effort to amend the Help America Vote
Act to enfranchise in federal elections all felons
who had completed parole and probation and
who had paid all fines went nowhere.76 Since
the Roberts Court seems most unlikely to re-
verse Richardson v. Ramirez,77 the 1974 case 
that ruled that criminal disfranchisement did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the
prospects of either Congress or the federal ju-
diciary easing this growing restriction on the
suffrage seem poor.
The chances for state legislation and litiga-
tion are better, if only because there are so
many states that it is difficult to stop any
changes from taking place somewhere. More
study of the legislative successes and failures,
described so tantalizingly by Abramsky—there
are many more descriptions than I have men-
tioned—is clearly needed. Particularly inter-
esting is the tension within the Democratic
party, which favors widespread enfranchise-
ment, particularly of people who would be
likely to vote Democratic, but which fears to be
considered soft on criminals.
Research and reform, or anti-reform for that
matter, are potentially very closely aligned
here. Three research questions seem particu-
larly pressing: First, under what conditions—
most notably, of partisan competition and con-
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trol—were measures tightening or loosening
restrictions on ex-criminal voting most likely to
pass in the legislatures of the several states?
Did a tight party balance or divided control, for
example, enhance or does it diminish the like-
lihood of suffrage liberalization?78 Second,
what arguments did the successful and unsuc-
cessful parties make during the debates? These
may not have been the most logical or factual
arguments, but the ones that were most effec-
tive in bringing about the success or failure of
the legislation. Third, how did those arguments
stack up against facts? Did opponents of ex-
felon voting try to paint the typical ex-con as a
rapist or murderer? Did proponents exagger-
ate the anxiousness of former prisoners to vote?
Locked Out and Conned repeatedly emphasize
the dearth of correct information that both of-
ficials and offenders display about exactly who
in this class of quasi-citizens can vote, a little
noticed but unsurprising fact in a fifty-state
system with frequent recent changes in the dis-
franchisement rules. Conned especially stresses
the complications and sometimes manipula-
tions of the bureaucratic process to deny peo-
ple the vote, which is referred to in the study
of social services for the poor as “bureaucratic
disentitlement.”79 These observations suggest
the importance of future, much more system-
atic research into two seemingly minor topics
that may have a major impact on the effect of
past and present criminal disfranchisement
laws: information dissemination and the bu-
reaucracy of disfranchisement. Before the pas-
sage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, it ap-
peared to some observers that a vaguely
defined fog of discrimination hung over
African-Americans’ right to vote in the South,
that specific laws, especially those that con-
cerned electoral structures, made little differ-
ence. As the mists cleared and blacks in the
Deep South began to vote again in large num-
bers, it became easier to see the sequence and
variety of laws and bureaucratic procedures
that had first established and then maintained
the system of disfranchisement.80 These two
books and the increasing literature that they
build on make possible a similar deepening of
scholarship and a strong connection between
research and political change that demon-
strates the continuing vitality of American so-
cial science.




78 It was weak party competition, rather than strong, that
was positively correlated with the order in which Amer-
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79 Joel Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in an Historical
Perspective, 16 N.Y.U. RREVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
457 (1987–88).
80 SHAPING, supra note 3; J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND
INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF







Please provide email address
